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ABSTRACT
Effective September 2015, the Washington State Legislature
passed two statutes which created both civil and criminal
liability against individuals who distribute "intimate images" of
others without their consent.1 These statutes were created to
combat the modern phenomenon colloquially known as
"revenge porn." Revenge porn is the non-consensual
distribution of nude or sexually explicit photographs or videos,
created with the intent to humiliate or harass the person these
images depict. In addition to causing emotional damage to the
victim, revenge porn can also produce broader consequences
such as loss of employment and stalking. Traditionally, litigating
these kinds of offenses has been difficult because traditional tort
theories have been ruled inadequate, defendants often fall back
on the Communications Decency Act ("CDA") to protect
websites hosting such material, and, until recently, such offenses
were not taken seriously. This Article focuses on the practical
concerns of litigating civil cases under Washington’s revenge
porn statute and its constitutional limitations under the CDA
and the First Amendment.



Jessy R. Nations, University of Washington School of Law, Class of 2017.
Thank you to Professor William Covington, David Ward, and the Washington
Journal of Law, Technology and Arts.
1
WASH. REV. CODE § § 4.24.795, 9a.86.010.
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INTRODUCTION
"Revenge porn", and nonconsensual pornography in general, are
uniquely modern phenomena where someone posts sexually explicit
or suggestive pictures or video of another person on the Internet
without their consent in order to humiliate them. Some people
engage in revenge porn by publicly posting nude and/or sexually
explicit pictures and videos of former romantic partners on the
Internet, often alongside their names and social media accounts, in

2017

REVENGE PORN AND NARROWING THE CDA

191

order to humiliate their former partner. In a recent example of
nonconsensual pornography, a group of hackers stole private
photographs from famous actresses—most of which were nude
photos—and published them on every Internet outlet they could
find.2
Many view revenge porn as the foolishness of 'kids these days',
and often blame the victim or tell them to "get over it"; however,
these cases can seriously impact the victim’s life.3 In addition to the
psychological damage caused by the initial humiliation and breach
of trust, many victims lose their jobs and suffer other negative
consequences in their personal lives.4
This Article begins with an outline of failed attempts to litigate
revenge porn cases under traditional tort law. It then explains the
elements of a revenge porn claim under WASH. REV. CODE §
4.24.795 (2015).5 The Article goes on to discuss the possibility of
litigation against host websites in the face of CDA protection,
followed by a discussion of the First Amendment concerns
regarding revenge porn. Lastly, this Article explores the ongoing
harm caused by this problem.

Jason Meisner, Chicago Man to Plead in Agreement Over ‘Celebegate’ Photo
Hacking,
CHICAGO
TRIBUNE,
(August
31,
2016),
http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/breaking/ct-celebrity-photoshacking-chicago-suspect-met-20160830-story.html (While the hackers were not
former romantic partners, this is still an example of non-consensual pornography.)
3
Hunter Moore, former owner of a popular revenge porn website, once referred
to himself as a "professional life-ruiner" and acknowledged that such websites
could benefit from provoking the suicides of victims. See Rheana Murray, Is
Anyone Up? Shuts Down: ‘Revenge Porn’ Forum Bought by Anti-Bullying
Website,
N.Y.
DAILY
NEWS
(April
20,
2012),
http://www.nydailynews.com/news/money/isanyoneup-shuts-revenge-pornforum-bought-anti-bullying-website-article-1.1064608. (internal quotations
omitted).
4
In one example, a teacher in Texas was fired after a co-worker discovered online
photos of the teacher where her breasts were visible. See Heather L. Carter et al.,
Have You Googled Your Teachers Lately? Teachers’ Use of Social
Networking Sites, 89 PHI DELTA KAPPAN 681, 683 (2008).
5
There is both a civil and criminal version of this statute. This Article focuses on
the civil version for the sake of brevity. The criminal version can be found at
WASH. REV. CODE § 9a.86.010.
2
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FAILED ATTEMPTS TO LITIGATE REVENGE PORN UNDER
TRADITIONAL TORT LAW

Litigants have attempted to combat revenge porn offenses under
several traditional tort theories. Some victims have even attempted
to copyright the photos in question in order to compel the host
website to take them down.6 Not only did such demands not work,
but the copyright process made the photos the victim was attempting
to keep private even more public.7 Other traditional tort theories—
such as defamation/false light, intentional infliction of emotional
distress ("IIED"), breach of privacy, and libel—have similarly
failed.8 This next section will address these failings in greater detail.
A. Defamation or False Light Theories
Defamation, stated broadly, is when one person publishes
false and harmful things about another.9 Several courts have ruled
against defamation or false light theories in cases of revenge porn
because the material published does not always contain false claims,
or even any fact-based claims at all. For example, in the recent case
of Patel v. Hussain,10 a spurned ex-boyfriend published sexually
explicit photos and videos of the victim, taken over the course of
several years. Because none of these photos or videos were
published alongside any factual claims about the victim, true or
false, the Texas Court of Appeals denied relief under a theory of
defamation. Specifically, the court held that the "a jury’s finding of
substantial truth precludes liability for a defamation claim."11 Based
on this, and similar lines of reasoning, false light theories have also
Erica Fink, To Fight Revenge Porn, I Had to Copyright My Breasts, CNN Tᴇᴄʜ
(April 27, 2015), http://money.cnn.com/2015/04/26/technology/copyright-boobsrevenge-porn/.
7
Id. ("[Submitting the nude photos for copyright protection] made Hilary cringe.
‘I thought, well no, this must be wrong ... they're forcing me to disclose them
further when that's what I was trying to prevent.’").
8
See Patel v. Hussain, 485 S.W.3d 153, 158 (Tex. App. 2016) (revenge porn
victim denied relief under a wide range of tort theories.).
9
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 558 (1977).
10
Patel at 158.
11
Id. at 174.
6
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been unsuccessful in providing relief to most victims of revenge
porn.12
B. IIED Theories
The plaintiff in Patel was also denied relief under a theory
of IIED.13 This tort usually arises as a "gap filler" when other
theories of liability are unavailable to a plaintiff.14 On appeal, the
Patel court held that the victim’s invasion of privacy claims barred
her from recovering under an IIED theory.15 Essentially, because
other tort theories were triable, the court reasoned that this gap had
already been filled and concluded that IIED was not available. Even
in cases where IIED claims are available, a successful claim requires
that the harm suffered be "utterly intolerable in a civilized
community."16 In certain communities, being a victim of revenge
porn might be considered offensive, but potentially not enough to be
"utterly intolerable in a civilized community."17 As such, courts may
suggest that not every victim of revenge porn suffers from emotional
harm in a way actionable under traditional tort law.
C. Breach of Privacy Theories
A breach of privacy claim in a revenge porn case commonly
12

Id; but see also, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652E, cmt. a (1976).
(explaining that falsehood is a required element of a false light claim.).
13
Patel v. Hussain, 485 S.W.3d at 158.
14
Id. at 176 (citing Hoffmann–La Roche Inc. v. Zeltwanger, 144 S.W.3d 438,
447 (Tex. 2004))
15
Id. at 176.
16
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46, cmt. d (2016).
17
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (2016) Illustration 4. Plaintiffs are
expected to be "hardened to a certain amount of rough language, and to occasional
acts that are definitely inconsiderate and unkind." Illustration 4 pushes at the
boundaries of what is tolerable in a civilized community. It reads, "A makes a
telephone call but is unable to get his number. In the course of an altercation with
the telephone operator, A calls her a God damned woman, a God damned liar, and
says that if he were there he would break her God damned neck. B suffers severe
emotional distress, broods over the incident, is unable to sleep, and is made ill.
A's conduct, although insulting, is not so outrageous or extreme as to make A
liable to B."
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fails for two reasons. First, the published images or videos may not
be "substantially certain to become public knowledge" and thus do
not meet the standard for invasion of privacy.18 In many revenge
porn cases, the published images remain available only to a small
audience.19 Second, the published images may be considered of
legitimate concern to the public.20 Many celebrities have had
intimate images of themselves stolen and published, some of whom
have made their sex lives part of their careers.21 Thus, a victim who
is publicly open about their sex life may also be barred from
recovering on invasion of privacy claims.22
II.

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY – REVENGE PORN AND
TRADITIONAL TORTS

Legislative notes strongly suggest that the Washington State
Legislature viewed a new statute for revenge porn as unnecessary
because existing causes of action under traditional tort doctrine
should have addressed the issue. As the committee notes,
"[l]i/ability currently exists for some harms that result from
disclosure of embarrassing or emotionally distressful material."23
That the legislature nevertheless enacted a bill directed specifically
towards revenge porn is a clear message to judges, juries, and
litigators that these cases should not be taken as some modern
anomaly brought on as a symptom of an oversensitive culture or
careless youths.24 This statement indicates that the committee
18

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §652E cmt. A (1977).
See, e.g. Merrit Kennedy, Senators Grill Top Marine Over Nude Photo Scandal,
NPR
(Mar.
14,
2017),
http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwoway/2017/03/14/520160602/senators-grill-top-marine-over-nude-photo-scandal
(nude photographs of female Marines shared among smaller selection of Marines
United)
20
Lee v. Penthouse Int'l, Ltd., No. CV96-7069SVW, 1997 WL 33384309 (C.D.
Cal. 1997) (unpublished)) (plaintiff’s claim for invasion of privacy barred due to
plaintiffs publicly discussing their sex lives openly in several publications).
21
Id.
22
Id.
23
Wash. H.R. Off. of Program Res. Jud. Comm., An act relating to the distribution
of intimate images, H.B. 2160, Wash. Leg., 2015-16 Reg. Sess., p. 1.
24
According to Laura Higgins, operator of the UK based revenge porn helpline,
"Police forces often don't take it seriously. There's a lot of victim-blaming that
19
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believed the law already holds individuals liable who disclose
information that is embarrassing to others, and that revenge porn
should be treated no differently.
The codified elements of revenge porn are nearly identical to
those of several traditional torts. As the legislature noted in its
review, "[t]he tort of invasion of privacy is codified in statute and is
based on the common law tort of public disclosure of private
facts."25
The bill summary also notes that, "[t]he tort of intentional
infliction of emotional distress, also known as the tort of outrage,
exists when a defendant engages in extreme and outrageous conduct
to intentionally or recklessly inflict emotional distress on a
plaintiff."26 This language highlights the harm and intent elements
of WASH. REV. CODE § 4.24.795. On the surface, this statute places
a limit on speech, but so do laws concerning IIED, which is a much
broader category of speech. Alternatively, this shows that these
claims are to be framed similarly to negligence claims—
specifically, plaintiffs would need to show (1) that defendants had a
duty to not distribute material that should be considered private, (2)
a breach of this reasonable expectation of privacy, (3) causation, and
(4) damages.
In light of the legislature's deliberate parallels to these tort
claims, future litigators in revenge porn suits would be well-advised
to frame their cases around elements common to similar torts. For
example, by showing that a reasonable expectation of privacy
existed, a complaint can read like an invasion of privacy claim. By
showing that the defendant’s behavior was so severe and outrageous
that it caused emotional harm to the plaintiff, a complaint can read
like an IIED claim. In such cases, litigators should seek to show that
something private was knowingly disclosed to the public without the
concerned party’s consent.

happens, unfortunately, and in particular men get a really tough break with this."
Revenge porn victims often blamed, says helpline, BBC Nᴇᴡs (Dec. 28, 2015),
http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-wales-34983437.
25
Wash. H.R. Off. of Program Res. Jud. Comm., supra note 24.
26
Id.
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ELEMENTS OF A REVENGE PORN CLAIM UNDER WASH.
REV. CODE § 4.24.795
A. Elements broadly

Thirty-four states, including Washington, recently passed
statutes to create both public and private causes of action for victims
of nonconsensual pornography.27 Some of these statutes have had
limited success; others have not.28
Washington’s private cause of action for victims of revenge porn
has three elements. Any person who (1) distributes an "intimate
image"29 of another person, (2) that they acquired that image under
circumstances that a reasonable person would know it was supposed
to remain private, and (3) distributes the image knowing that the
distribution would cause that person harm will be liable under this
statute.30 The statute defines its key terms, such as "intimate
images," and sets out specific factors for juries to consider when
assessing the reasonable expectation of privacy.31
B.

What is an "Intimate Image"?

Section five of WASH. REV. CODE § 4.24.795(5) defines an
"intimate image" as "any photograph, motion picture film,
videotape, digital image, or any other recording or transmission of
another person ... that was taken in a private setting."32 In creating
this definition, the Washington State Legislature cast a broad net in
terms of the various formats with which such images could be
27

See WASH. REV. CODE § § 4.24.795 (2016) (civil statute), 9a.86.010 (2016)
(criminal statute).
28
For example: Arizona abandoned its statute as being too broad to enforce in
2015. See Joe Mullin, Arizona makes deal with ACLU, won’t enforce bad law on
“"revenge porn”", ARS Technica, July 12, 2015, https://arstechnica.com/techpolicy/2015/07/arizona-makes-deal-with-aclu-wont-enforce-bad-law-onrevenge-porn/
29
"Intimate image" is defined in WASH. REV. CODE § 4.24.795(5) (2016); see also
Part III.B infra.
30
WASH. REV. CODE § 4.24.795(2) (2016).
31
WASH. REV. CODE § 4.24.795(5).
32
Id.
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captured.33 Most modern media could be summed up as "digital
images," but this definition likely expands the statute to cover
analogous forms such as VHS or Betamax since both would be
considered a "motion picture film" or "videotape."
This section also establishes criteria for what makes an
image "intimate." Images are only "intimate" if they depict "[s]exual
activity, including sexual intercourse defined in RCW 9A.44.010,"
or "[a] person’s intimate body parts, whether nude or visible through
less than opaque clothing."34 This language suggests that certain
kinds of images will not be protected by the statute. For example,
sharing images of someone in opaque lingerie or wearing a swimsuit
may not be actionable under the statute.35 While risqué photographs
published without a plaintiff’s knowledge may cause distress, the
publication is unlikely to be actionable as revenge porn unless
intimate body parts are visible or the image depicts sexual activity.36
C.

Reasonable Expectation of Privacy

The revenge porn statute does not explicitly define a "reasonable
expectation of privacy." Instead, it lists factors that determine
"whether a reasonable person would know or understand that the
image was to remain private."37 One factor is the nature of the
relationship between the parties.38 For instance, people are more
likely to expect privacy in communications with a romantic partner
than with a modeling agent. Another factor courts may consider is
the circumstance under which the image was taken.39 For example,
Id. ("‘intimate image’ means any photograph, motion picture film, videotape,
digital image, or any other recording or transmission of another person who is
identifiable from the image itself or from information displayed with or otherwise
connected to the image.")
34
WASH. REV. CODE § 4.24.795(5)(a)-(b).
35
However, the bill summary notes that an intimate image might include "a
person’s intimate apparel." Wash. H.R. Off. of Program Res. Jud. Comm., An act
relating to the distribution of intimate images, H.B. 2160, Wash. Leg., 2015-16
Reg. Sess., p. 2.
36
See Wash. H.R. Off. of Program Res. Jud. Comm., supra note 36.
37
WASH. REV. CODE § 4.24.795(3) (2016).
38
WASH. REV. CODE § 4.24.795(3)(a).
39
WASH. REV. CODE § 4.24.795(3)(b).
33
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was the photo taken in the privacy of a home, or was it taken during
a professional photo-shoot or public event? Arguably, photos taken
at home carry a greater expectation of privacy than those taken in
public. The circumstances of distribution may also be a factor:40
photos posted on a photographer’s art blog would likely carry less
culpability than myexgirlfriend.com. The former implies some
consent to publication, while the latter does not. Lastly, the statute
also allows courts to consider "other relevant factors".41 This is a
standard legislative catch-all indicating the list above is not meant
to be exhaustive. Often the privacy element in revenge porn cases is
fact-intensive, as these offenses happen in a wide variety of settings.
As such, attorneys would be well advised to develop the facts of
these cases in great detail.
D.

Damages and Attorney’s Fees

Quantifying damages under this statute presents some difficulty.
WASH. REV. CODE § 4.24.795 states that anyone who distributes
intimate images of another person without their consent is subject to
"actual damages including, but not limited to, pain and suffering,
emotional distress, economic damages, and lost earnings, reasonable
attorneys’ fees, and costs."42 While some of these damages will be
easily calculable, damages due to emotional distress, pain and
suffering, and so on, are notoriously nebulous in a legal context.43
IV.

OBSTACLES TO REVENGE PORN LITIGATION

A. The Communications Decency Act ("CDA") Could Bar
Litigation against Host Websites

40

WASH. REV. CODE § 4.24.795(3)(c).
WASH. REV. CODE § 4.24.795(3)(d).
42
WASH. REV. CODE § 4.24.795(2).
43
The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § § 924 cmt. b, 912 cmt. a (1979) states
that "[n]o rule can be stated profitably on the amount of damages recoverable for
[emotional] harms." In another section, it states that one cannot prove with
certainty any real equivalence between emotional damages and compensation in
money.
41
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The CDA provides a defense to host websites, and thus has
barred causes of action against the root cause of revenge porn.44
However, recent cases across several circuits have shown that the
CDA does not offer complete immunity to websites from lawsuits.
Congress enacted the CDA in 1998 in response to Stratton
Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Services45 and several similar cases.46 In
Stratton, the court held that the defendant’s message board was akin
to a newspaper; as such, by taking steps to police the content of this
message board, the defendant had engaged in an editorial function
that exposed it to publisher liability.47 As later courts have also
observed, Congress did not want to punish website operators for
engaging in this kind of self-policing.48 Rather, Congress passed the
CDA to protect website operators from this liability, and to bolster
the "free and open" nature of the Internet.49
Under the CDA, "[n]o provider or user of an interactive
computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any
information provided by another information content provider."50
An interactive service provider is defined as "any information
service, system, or access software provider that provides or enables
computer access by multiple users to a computer server."51 This
essentially means that those who post are responsible for their
words, but those who host the content are not. This has the practical
44

See GoDaddy.com, LLC v. Toups, 429 S.W.3d 752 (Tex. Ct. App. 2014).
Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Services, Co., 1995 WL 323710, (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. May 24, 1995) (unpublished).
46
See, e.g., Fair Housing Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com,
521 F.3d 1157, 1163 (9th Cir. 2008).
47
See Stratton at *3. ("The choice of material to go into a newspaper and the
decisions made as to the content of the paper constitute the exercise of editorial
control and judgment . . ., and with this editorial control comes increased
liability.").
48
J.S. v. Vill. Voice Media Holdings, 359 P.3d 714, 724 (Wash. 2015) ("Before
it passed this statute, Congress weighed the competing policies of fostering robust
interactive service provider growth, promoting self-policing by the interactive
service provider industry, and protecting against victimization by Internet
advertisements") (emphasis added).
49
Jones. v. Dirty World Ent., 755 F.3d 398, 417 (6th Cir. 2014) (quoting 47 U.S.C.
§ 230(a)(1)-(5)).
50
47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1).
51
47 U.S.C. at § 230(f)(2).
45
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effect of barring plaintiffs from seeking remedy against online
platforms that host "revenge porn."
Two landmark cases have addressed this matter. In Fair Housing
Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com the Ninth
Circuit imposed criminal liability against an "interactive service
provider."52 The Roommates court found that the defendant was an
"information content provider,"53 despite the fact that the bulk of
their website went to hosting third-party content. This was because
the defendant had "materially contributed" to the unlawful nature of
the content in question.54 By requiring that users submit information
regarding their race, marital status, etc., the defendant had
developed and materially contributed to content that could
potentially violate the Fair Housing Act.55 However, the defendant
also encouraged its users to post additional comments, many of
which contained discriminatory content. These, the court held, were
not subject to publisher liability. Nothing about the defendant’s
"additional comments" section required users to submit
discriminatory content56 or any other form of content that could
potentially violate the Fair Housing Act on its own. Thus, the Ninth
Circuit granted the defendant immunity from liability for these
comments.
This is significant to revenge porn cases because some websites
may not explicitly host this type of content. For example, if a
defendant uploads their images to a content neutral website (e.g.,
Facebook or Imgur57), then the host website will fail the material
contribution test and likely be protected by the CDA.
52

Fair Housing Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, 521 F.3d
1157 (9th Cir. 2008).
53
The CDA defines the term as "any person or entity that is responsible, in whole
or in part, for the creation or development of information provided through the
Internet or any other interactive computer service." 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(3).
54
SeeRoommates, 521 F.3d at 1167–1168. ("…we interpret the term
"development" as referring not merely to augmenting the content generally, but
to materially contributing to its alleged unlawfulness").
55
Id. at 1169.
56
Examples of comments included "NOT looking for black Muslims," and "[no]
psychos or anyone on mental medication." See id. at 1174.
57
Facebook.com is a generic social media website. Imgur.com is a website that
hosts any images its users will post (subject to their terms and conditions).
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The Sixth Circuit also relied on this idea of "material
contribution" in Jones v. Dirty World Entertainment.58 While the
court found the defendant immune from suit under the CDA, the
court employed the material contribution test to determine immunity
in a civil suit.59 The Jones court specifically stated that "the CDA
does not necessarily leave persons who are the objects of
anonymously posted, online, defamatory content without a
remedy."60 Jones suggests that there may not be blanket immunity
for website operators in either a civil or criminal context. Under
Jones, if a content host passes the material contribution test, then it
crosses the line from "interactive service provider" into "information
content provider," and is open to liability.
The statutory language giving rise to the material contribution
test is the definition of "information content provider."61 Under the
CDA’s definition, a content provider is "any person or entity that is
responsible, in whole or in part, for the creation or development of
information provided through the Internet or any other interactive
computer service."62 The Roommates court decided that a website
can operate in two capacities: (1) as an interactive service provider
whose activities are immune under the CDA; and (2) as an
"information content provider,"63 which is not immune under the
CDA. The court held that:
"… if [a website] passively displays content that is created
entirely by third parties, then it is only a service provider with
respect to that content. But as to content that it creates itself, or
is "responsible, in whole or in part" for creating or developing,
the website is also a content provider."64
Substituting "material contribution" for "development" does not,
58

Jones. v. Dirty World Entertainment, 755 F.3d 398, 411(6th Cir. 2014).
Id. The comments giving rise to the plaintiff’s defamation suit were merely
edited and displayed by the defendant according to the Sixth Circuit.
60
Id. at 417.
61
Fair Housing Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, 521 F.3d
1157, 1162 (9th Cir. 2008).
62
47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(3) (emphasis added).
63
Roommates at 1162.
64
Id.
59
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on its own, clarify the limits of CDA immunity. While the
Roommates court did not provide a clear definition of "material
contribution," it listed a number of factors to weigh in the test. Each
factor requires a website operator to do something beyond passively
transmitting other people’s data.65 The contribution also needs to go
beyond simply providing users with the option to create illegal or
unlawful content.66 For example, simply hosting images—be they
nude photos or pictures of dogs—contributes nothing to the content
that users post on a website. However, a website that collects nude
photos from all corners of the internet on its own initiative is doing
more than passively transmitting its users’ data, and will likely be
found to have made a "material contribution".
This debate led to the Sixth Circuit’s decision in Jones. The
Jones court held that an online tabloid, which selected and edited
defamatory comments about private individuals did not "materially
contribute" to the unlawful content.67 The defendant in Jones
operated a website dedicated entirely to the public humiliation of
private individuals through comments and photographs submitted
by third parties. While the substantive content came from
submissions, the defendant both curated and published content with
his own commentary.68 Nevertheless, the court held that the
defendant was merely performing a passive editorial function and
was thus free from liability.69
The term "material contribution" remains demonstrably vague—
due in part, the Jones court suggested, to the policy reasons behind
the CDA.70 The court stated that Congress "envisioned a free and
open internet," and that the immunity that § 230 provides serves that
purpose.71 However, not only do the words "free and open" not
appear in the section the court cited (§ 230(a)(1)-(5)), but the actual
statement of policy is § 230(b), which states in a sub-provision that
"it is the policy of the United States … to ensure vigorous
65

Id. at 1166-1167.
Id. at 1168.
67
Jones v. Dirty World Entertainment, 755 F.3d 398, 416 (6th Cir. 2014).
68
All of this was supposedly done for the purpose of “humor.” Id. at 403.
69
Id. at 416.
70
Id. at 417.
71
Id.
66
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enforcement of Federal criminal law to deter and punish trafficking
in obscenity, stalking, and harassment by means of computer."72
This suggests that, at least on a criminal level, the CDA was passed
in part to prevent forms of harassment like revenge porn, and not to
provide online harassers a shield against liability. A surprising
number of courts have ignored this language in leading CDA
cases.73
FTC v. Accusearch Inc. also weighed in on the definition of
"material contribution" under the CDA. In this case, the Tenth
Circuit denied the defendant immunity under the CDA, holding that
"a service provider is ‘responsible’ for the development of offensive
content only if it in some way specifically encourages development
of what is offensive about the content."74 This "encouragement test"
was mentioned in the Jones appeal,75 but was ultimately dismissed.
The key difference between Jones and Accusearch, the Sixth Circuit
reasoned, was that the defendant in Accusearch had bought and sold
the offensive content for money, whereas the defendant in Jones
collected and published his content for free.76
However, one does not have to offer money to constitute
solicitation of illegal material. There are many websites whose
raison d’etre is the collection and publication of revenge porn.77
While revenge porn websites often do not offer money in exchange
for their content, they still exist solely to propagate this type of
material and to profit from it. This "encouragement" or "solicitation
test", should Washington courts adopt it, would circumvent CDA
immunity by showing that the host site exists solely to publish
harmful, non-consensual content that is unlawful under Washington
statute.
Attorneys will likely have to target websites hosting revenge
porn rather than the original posters alone in order to more

72

47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(5) (emphasis added).
One notable exception, which will be discussed below, is J.S. v. Village Voice
Media Holdings L.L.C., 359 P.3d 714, 720, Wiggins J. Concurring (Wash. 2015).
74
570 F.3d 1187, 1199 (12th Cir. 2009) (emphasis added).
75
Jones v. Dirty World Entertainment, 755 F.3d 398, 414 (6th Cir. 2014).
76
Id.
77
Id. at 413 (quoting Accusearch, 570 F.3d 1187 at 1200).
73
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effectively deter non-consensual pornography.78 Depending on the
circumstances, a revenge porn website might do nothing more than
passively publish other people’s illicit photos. Or it might, for
example, contribute materially to its third party content by requiring
submissions to include personal information of the person depicted.
As such, attorneys should also emphasize the statement of policy
embodied in section (b) of the CDA because revenge porn is the
exact type of "stalking, and harassment by means of computer"79
that the CDA was designed to punish.
1.

J.S. v. Village Voice: New CDA Jurisprudence in
Washington

In 2015, the Supreme Court of Washington decided a landmark
case regarding the limits of CDA immunity. In J.S. v. Village Voice
Media Holdings, L.L.C., a group of minors sued a website operator
who hosted ads that allegedly led to children being "bought and sold
for sexual services online on Backpage.com in advertisements."80
The issue before the court was whether the plaintiffs’ case should be
dismissed under Washington Superior Court Civil (CR) Rule
12(b)(6)81 ("Rule 12(b)(6)"), in spite of a potential conflict with the
CDA, or whether the case should be allowed to go forward.82 The
majority opinion, authored by Justice Gonzales, highlighted the fact
that, when considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, courts must "accept
as true the allegations in a plaintiff’s complaint and any reasonable
inferences therein."83
The plaintiffs in Village Voice alleged, that the defendants had
"developed content requirements that it [knew would] allow pimps
and prostitutes to evade law enforcement," and that "the content
requirements [were] nothing more than a method developed by [the
Washington’s statute specifically mentions CDA immunity. WASH. REV. CODE
§ 4.24.795(7) (2016) ("Nothing in this section shall be construed to impose
liability on an interactive computer service, as defined in 47 U.S.C. 230(f)(2).").
79
47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(5).
80
J.S. v. Vill. Voice Media Holdings, 359 P.3d 714, 717 (Wash. 2015).
81
"Failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." Wash. Super. Ct.
Civ. R. 12(b)(6) (2015).
82
Vill. Voice Media Holdings, 359 P.3d at 717.
83
Id. at 716 (quoting Reid v. Pierce County, 961 P.2d 333, 336 (Wash. 1998)).
78
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defendants] to allow pimps, prostitutes, and Backpage.com to evade
law enforcement for illegal sex trafficking, including the trafficking
of minors for sex."84 Given the deference granted to the plaintiffs’
allegations under Rule 12(b)(6), the Washington Supreme Court
found that the facts as alleged were sufficient to satisfy the material
contribution test of Roommates.com, and remanded the case back to
the trial court.85
The concurring opinion of Justice Wiggins delved further into
the defendants’ failure to qualify for CDA immunity. Justice
Wiggins examined the language of the CDA and determined "that
subsection 230(c)(1) creates a defense to, not an immunity [from]",
liability.86 The defense created under the CDA only applies when
the "plaintiff seeks to treat [the defendant], under a state law cause
of action, as a publisher or speaker of information."87 The
"[p]laintiffs’ claims that Backpage.com created "content rules"
specifically designed to induce sex trafficking and evade law
enforcement did not treat Backpage.com as the publisher or speaker
of another's information.88
If Justice Wiggins’ concurrence in Village Voice takes hold,
litigators should not frame their complaints on the basis of publisher
liability, but rather as a direct violation of R.C.W. § 4.94.795.
Indeed, the civil statute does not say "[a] person who publishes an
intimate image of another person," but instead "[a] person who
distributes an intimate image of another person" intentionally and
without consent is subject to liability.89 As such, complaints against
revenge porn websites should use language that invokes the material
contribution test found in Roommates and Jones. The language
should emphasize the following: (1) that a defendant’s website
distributes non-consensual pornography; (2) that website holds
itself out to the public as a distributor of non-consensual
84

Id. at 718.
Id. at 717 ("Viewing J.S.'s allegations in the light most favorable to J.S., as we
must at this stage, J.S. alleged facts that, if proved true, would show that Backpage
did more than simply maintain neutral policies prohibiting or limiting certain
content").
86
Id. at 721.
87
Id. at 719.
88
Id.
89
WASH. REV. CODE § 4.24.795(1), (2016) (emphasis added).
85
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pornography; and (3) this materially contributes to the distribution
of non-consensual pornography featuring the plaintiff.90
B.

First Amendment Concerns

Critics of revenge porn laws, such as the ACLU,91 have asserted
that these statutes could be interpreted too broadly, and ultimately
infringe upon the publisher’s First Amendment right to free
speech.92 However, many of these concerns are precisely why intent
and actual harm requirements were written into similar statutes in
other states.93 In F.C.C. v. Pacifica Foundation,94 the Supreme
Court of the United States declared that speech that is highly
offensive, harmful, and does not hold any social value is not entitled
to protection under the First Amendment. Specifically, the Court
held that "[s]uch utterances are no essential part of any exposition
of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any
benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the
social interest in order and morality."95 So long as juries are likely
to be convinced that the harm inflicted by this content significantly
90

The language of the statute specifically mentions CDA immunity. See WASH.
REV. CODE § 4.24.795(7) (2016) ("Nothing in this section shall be construed to
impose liability on an interactive computer service, as defined in 47 U.S.C.
230(f)(2)") For further reading on the CDA as it relates to revenge porn, see Peter
W. Cooper, The Right to be Virtually Clothed, 91 WASH. L. REV. 817, 828 (2016).
Cooper frames the CDA defense in terms akin to someone who puts up "an empty
newsrack" (the host site) and the users who fill the rack with whatever content
they choose. It could (and perhaps should) be argued that there is a substantive
distance between putting up a cork board saying "post pictures here," and putting
up a cork board that specifically says, "illegally post nude photos of your ex-lovers
in order to humiliate them here."
91
Rick Stone, In Florida, ‘Revenge Porn’ Is a Moving Target, WLRN (Dec. 4,
2013, 7:56 AM), http://wlrn.org/post/florida-revenge-porn-moving-target.
92
See Amanda L. Cecil, Taking Back the Internet: Imposing Civil Liability on
Interactive Computer Services in an Attempt to Provide an Adequate Remedy to
Victims of Nonconsensual Pornography, 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 2513, 2535
(2014).
93
Cecil, supra note 93 ("In response to [First Amendment] criticisms, California
narrowed the scope of its law by adding the intent and proof of harm
requirements.").
94
F.C.C. v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
95
Id. at 746.
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outweighs any social benefit it might offer, the First Amendment
should not deter litigation under this statute.96 Attorneys should
emphasize the harm caused by non-consensual pornography, as well
as the malice behind it.
Further, revenge porn falls under a number of exceptions to First
Amendment protection. The most logical of these is the obscenity
exception. In Miller v. California, the Supreme Court held that "[a]t
a minimum, prurient, patently offensive depiction or description of
sexual conduct must have serious literary, artistic, political, or
scientific value to merit First Amendment protection."97 Given that
revenge porn likely does not have such value,98 it likely falls within
the obscenity exception found in Miller.
Secondly, given the fact that revenge porn is intended to harm
the victim’s reputation and "blacken their good name," it will likely
fall under the defamation exception established in New York Times
Co. v. Sullivan.99
Third, given the fact that revenge porn is illegal in Washington,
and often accompanied by the target’s personal information (e.g.,
name, address, phone numbers, links to social media accounts, etc.),
revenge porn could fall under the incitement exception found in
Brandenburg v. Ohio.100 Nearly half of all revenge porn victims
report that they have been stalked and harassed by people who saw
While there doesn’t appear to be a revenge porn case decided on First
Amendment grounds, in Milo v. Martin, the court noted that, when it comes to the
CDA “Congress apparently made a choice ‘not to deter harmful online speech
through the separate route of imposing tort liability on companies that serve as
intermediaries[.]’” 311 S.W.3d 210, 215 (Tex. Ct. App. 2010). This suggests that
Congress has not contemplated revenge porn and how it relates to the First
Amendment.
97
Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 26 (1973) (emphasis added).
98
Hunter Moore publically admitted that his revenge porn website existed only to
cause public humiliation. Murray, supra note 4.
99
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269 (1964) ("libel can claim
no talismanic immunity from constitutional limitations. It must be measured by
standards that satisfy the First Amendment.")
100
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) ("[F]ree speech and free press
do not permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law
violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing
imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action.”) (emphasis
added).
96
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their nude photos online.101 The Brandenburg states that speech that
is likely to create "imminent lawlessness" and is "likely to incite or
produce such [lawless] action."102 Given the fact that many revenge
porn websites post their victim’s personal information (e.g., address,
workplace, etc.103), and the high percentage of victims who
experience stalking as a result,104 the imminence and likelihood
requirements of Brandenburg’s incitement exception are satisfied.
Thus, revenge porn websites arguably incite people to perform
unlawful acts (such as distributing revenge porn) and also incite
people to stalk and harass revenge porn victims.
C. The Legal Profession Remains Unfamiliar with the
Internet
Washington State’s revenge porn revenge porn statute was
passed in part because there was a "lack of understanding of what
revenge porn was," within the legal profession.105 There is still a
presumption that sharing any kind of intimate content, be it a photo
for your long-distance sweetheart or one taken for other purposes,
implies that such content becomes open to the public.106 However,
revenge porn causes a great deal of emotional harm and has the
potential to ruin lives. Litigators and courts alike need to take these
offenses seriously, both in the technical aspects of revenge porn and
the harm it causes for the sake of clients and society as whole.

101

Mary Anne Franks, Drafting an Effective "Revenge Porn" Law: A Guide for
Legislatures, Cʏʙᴇʀ Cɪᴠɪʟ Rɪɢʜᴛs Iɴɪᴛɪᴀᴛɪᴠᴇ, (Sep. 22, 2016),
https://www.cybercivilrights.org/guide-to-legislation/.
102
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. at 447.
103
Franks, supra note 101 at 11.
104
Franks, supra note 101.
105
Josh
Feit,
Image
Wars,
SEATTLE
MET
(May
2015),
http://www.seattlemet.com/articles/2015/4/24/revenge-porn-law-passeswashington-state-may-2015.
106
See, e.g. Rebecca Pocklington, Jennifer Lawrence to blame for her naked
picture leak - says Ricky Gervais (who later deleted his comment), MIRROR
CELEBRITY NEWS, (Sep. 23, 2014), http://www.mirror.co.uk/3am/celebritynews/jennifer-lawrence-blame-naked-picture-4145801.
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CONCLUSION
Revenge porn is a serious offense that affects many people—
mostly women—in today’s world. Washington’s legislature has
made it clear that this problem should be treated as a violation of
privacy and as a malicious infliction of emotional harm. Therefore,
the legal community should not hesitate to take these cases, both
against individual offenders and websites hosting this content.
While the CDA and the First Amendment present obstacles to
litigation, they are not impossible to overcome. Attorneys seeking
to hold host websites liable need to demonstrate that the host
"materially contributed" to the illicit nature of the content by
showing that they did more than passively transmit information
from third parties. Many of the predecessor statutes to WASH. REV.
CODE § 4.24.795 have been challenged on several grounds, and if
Washington’s statute is to survive, then litigators must tread
carefully to avoid both CDA and First Amendment defenses.
Lastly, this statute represents an encouraging step in the right
direction for Washington State and the country as a whole. Lawyers
in the contemporary era are grappling with problems that previous
generations could not have anticipated. This demonstrates an
attempt by the law to enter into the twenty first century by showing
that an individual’s rights do not end at the computer screen. WASH.
REV. CODE § 4.27.795, and its criminal counterpart, will grant
victims an adequate remedy for the very real damage that revenge
porn can cause. The legal profession would do well to take these
cases seriously.
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PRACTICE POINTERS
● Revenge porn is actionable when someone distributes nude
photos of someone without their consent and with the intent
to cause them harm.
● Revenge porn is unlikely to be protected under the First
Amendment because it falls under a number of exceptions to
free speech, including obscenity, defamation, and
incitement.
● Host websites for such material are generally protected
under the CDA; however, case law expanding upon the
material contribution test suggests that revenge porn
websites may be subject to liability for revenge porn as well.
● Attorneys would be well-advised to examine how, if at all,
hosts of non-consensual pornography and revenge porn
contribute to the illegal nature of their content.

